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AT SARDIS IN AUTUMN 387 TIRIBAZUS, the satrap of Lydia, read to assembled representatives of numerous Greek states an edict issued by the Persian king, Artaxerxes II. The terms of the edict were to form the basis of the "King's Peace" of 386, a settlement that terminated the Corinthian War on the mainland, asserted a principle of autonomy in Greek interstate relations, and affirmed Persian authority over various Greek states outside mainland Greece. According to the version of the edict preserved by Xenophon, Artaxerxes insisted on the recognition of Persian sovereignty not only over the cities of Asia Minor, but also over the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus (*Hell.* 5.1.31). The Persian claim to the tiny island of Clazomenae has never been adequately explained, and the coupling of Clazomenae and the great island of Cyprus certainly appears to produce what one scholar has called "an oddly assorted pair."<sup>1</sup> Events following the promulgation of the edict of 387 and the ratification of the King's Peace early in 386 may point to the political and military situation in the eastern Mediterranean in late 387 which gave Clazomenae such apparent importance to Persia and made necessary Artaxerxes' specific claim to Clazomenae in the edict of Sardis.

Diodorus records that in 386 Artaxerxes began preparations for a campaign against Evagoras, King of Cypriote Salamis, ultimately assembling land forces of three hundred thousand men, including cavalry, and a fleet of three hundred triremes (stereotypical figures but indicative of a very large expedition).<sup>2</sup> Diodorus' report that Orontes and Tiribazus, the commanders-in-chief of the expedition, assumed command of the assembled forces in western Asia Minor at Phocaea and Cyme suggests that the Persians mustered troops and ships in or near Phocaea and Cyme, the same region in

<sup>1</sup>G. E. Bean, *Aegean Turkey* (New York 1966) 130. Cf. P. Gardner, *A History of Ancient Coinage* (Oxford 1918) 262: "The juxtaposition of the great island of Cyprus and the tiny islet of Clazomenae is almost ludicrous." F. Nolte, *Die historisch-politischen Voraussetzungen des Königsfriedens* (Bamberg 1929) 7-8, is the only scholar to offer a specific explanation of the Persian claim to Clazomenae: remarking "wie seltsam sich kleine Forderungen des Augenblicks in der Arrangierung grosser epochmachender Entscheidungen ausprägen," he suggests that in response to an appeal by Clazomenae oligarchs Artaxerxes added to the edict of Sardis the claim to Clazomenae as a kind of rider, signifying Persian support for oligarchs at Clazomenae and aiming at terminating civil strife in Clazomenae by the advertisement alone of such support.

<sup>2</sup>On such stereotypical figures in Diodorus, see C. A. Volquardsen, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichten bei Diodor, Buch XI bis XVI* (Kiel 1863) 65.

which the Persian fleet had assembled prior to the invasion of Greece and in which remnants of the fleet had wintered in 480/79 after the Persian defeat at Salamis (Diod. 11.2.3; Hdt. 8.130). Phocaea on the northern shore of the Gulf of Smyrna was most probably the center of naval preparations in 386. With two harbors, one of whose capacity drew special comment from Livy (37.31.10), Phocaea was perhaps able to accommodate much of the Persian fleet, though other cities on or near the Gulf of Smyrna may well have assisted.

Diodorus explains Artaxerxes' preparations for the Cypriote War by noting that Evagoras was master of almost all of Cyprus and had assembled great forces (14.110.5), but other evidence may indicate more fully the Persian concerns which lay behind the Cypriote War. Diodorus himself observes that at the time Persia began preparations for the Cypriote War (386) Evagoras was master of Tyre and certain other Phoenician cities (15.2.4). Isocrates' statement in the *Evagoras* that Evagoras ravaged Phoenicia, seized Tyre by storm, and also brought about the revolt of Cilicia from Persian authority undoubtedly testifies to and describes in more detail Evagoras' activities before 386 (*Evag.* 62; cf. *Paneg.* 161). As recently as 391/0 Evagoras had been unable to defend himself from a Persian attack aimed at ending his expansion on Cyprus,<sup>3</sup> and it is likely that it was only during 387 after the arrival of troops and ships from Athens under the command of Chabrias that Evagoras was able to act successfully outside Cyprus (see Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.10; Dem. 20 [*Lept.*] 76; Nep. *Chab.* 2.2). As a result, therefore, of Evagoras' activities in 387 Persia had by late 387 lost control of Phoenicia and Cilicia.

The loss of the coastal regions opposite Cyprus coincided, it appears, with the defeat of Persian forces which had been fighting since 389 to reconquer Egypt, rebelliously independent since about 404.<sup>4</sup> Discussing recent Persian military enterprises in the *Panegyricus*, delivered in 380, Isocrates states that the Persian commanders Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus spent three years campaigning in Egypt and that following this Artaxerxes has been at war with Evagoras for six years.<sup>5</sup> The Persian

<sup>3</sup>In the face of imminent Persian attack (see Diod. 14.98.3-4) Evagoras had to send hastily to Athens for ships, sailors, and weapons. Evagoras lacked even sufficient funds to pay for these, and only the generosity of individual Athenians made it possible for Evagoras' ambassadors to acquire ships and other necessities; see Lys. 19 (*On the Property of Aristophanes*) 21-23. E. A. Costa, Jr., "Evagoras I and the Persians, ca 411 to 391 B.C.," *Historia* 23 (1974) 40-56, discusses Evagoras' activities before 391/0.

<sup>4</sup>Isoc. *Phil.* 101 states that Egypt was in revolt at the time Cyrus marched against Artaxerxes (401), and F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin 1953) 76, suggests that the revolt occurred at the time of Artaxerxes' accession in 404.

<sup>5</sup>On the date of the delivery of the *Panegyricus*, see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen 2* (Berlin 1893) 380.

preparations in the Gulf of Smyrna for the Cypriote War began, according to Diodorus, in 386 and plausibly mark the beginning of the six-year period of war against Evagoras cited by Isocrates in 380.<sup>6</sup> The three-year Persian campaign against Egypt which Isocrates places before the Cypriote War must therefore fall before 386,<sup>7</sup> and the attested presence of Pharnabazus, one of the Persian commanders of the Egyptian expedition, in his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia some time in 389 makes a date in 389 the *terminus post quem* for the beginning of Persia's Egyptian campaign (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33).<sup>8</sup> Persian forces were therefore fighting in Egypt from 389 through 387. Isocrates' notice in the *Panegyricus* that the Persians "suffered more losses than they caused" and finally had to withdraw shamefully thus reveals that by late 387 the Persian campaign against Egypt had failed ignominiously (*Paneg.* 140).

Consequently, by late 387 Persia faced the necessity of mounting a new campaign against Egypt at a time when Evagoras had just disrupted Persian control of Cilicia and Phoenicia, the natural staging grounds for any Persian expedition against Egypt.<sup>9</sup> In order now to renew the attempt to reconquer Egypt Artaxerxes had first to recover Phoenicia and Cilicia so that these could provide ships and sailors and assembly and supply centers for an Egyptian expedition. Certainly this consideration rather than merely

<sup>6</sup>The failure of C. I. Reid, "Ephoros Fragment 76 and Diodorus on the Cypriote War," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 135–143, to take into account the three-year war against Egypt which Artaxerxes fought before the Cypriote War vitiates her attempt to date Isocrates' six years of war against Evagoras to 391/0–385/4.

<sup>7</sup>See W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg 1892) 153–154; T. Lenschau, "Pharnabazus," *RE* 19 (1938) 1847; P. Clodé, "La Grèce et l'Égypte de 405 à 345/1 avant J.-C.," *Revue Egyptologique* 1 (1919) 225, n. 1. There is no reason to infer from Chabrias' attested presence in Egypt after 386 (Diod. 15.29.2) that he commanded Egyptian forces during a Persian offensive and accordingly to place Persia's Egyptian campaign after 386 (as does K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup> 3.2 [Berlin and Leipzig 1923] 228–229). Pharnabazus' complaints to Athens quickly effected Chabrias' recall in or shortly after 380 (Diod. 15.29.4; Judeich 158), and it is implausible that if Persian forces were actually fighting in Egypt after 386, Pharnabazus would have suffered Chabrias' leadership of Egyptian forces. Diodorus (15.29.3) knows only of preparations undertaken by Chabrias during his stay in Egypt, and it is most probable that such preparations represented the full extent of Chabrias' activities in Egypt ca 386–380.

<sup>8</sup>The passage in Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.28) which E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* (Stuttgart 1915) 5.306 n. 2, cites as evidence for Pharnabazus' presence in Hellespontine Phrygia as late as 387 says only that by this time Pharnabazus ἤδη ὤχετο.

<sup>9</sup>Persia assembled a large force in Phoenicia in 401 under Abrocamas, undoubtedly for use against Egypt, that had to be diverted to meet Cyrus; see Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.5; Kienitz (above, note 4) 76. The numerous ships which the Syracusan Herodas saw in Phoenicia in 397 most probably indicate Persian use of Phoenicia in the 390s for preparations against Egypt; see Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1; H. R. Hall, "Egypt to the Coming of Alexander," *CAH* 6 (Cambridge 1927) 145. Nep. *Dar.* 5.5 and Diod. 16.41.5, 46.6 point to Persian use of Phoenicia in campaigns against Egypt in the 370s and 340s.

concern about Evagoras' aggression on Cyprus determined Artaxerxes by late 387 to make war on Evagoras and to begin preparations in 386 for a Cypriote War.

With control of Cilicia and Phoenicia lost by late 387, Persia had access to the Mediterranean only in western Asia Minor. In late 387, therefore, Artaxerxes and his advisors were undoubtedly vitally interested in conditions in western Asia Minor and particularly in the Gulf of Smyrna where Greek port cities, especially Phocaea with its capacious harbors, offered fine and familiar locations for assembling a large naval expedition.

Cities in the Gulf of Smyrna region, however, appear to have been among those joined to Athens by Thrasybulus during his campaign in 389. An Athenian decree dating from the archonship of Theodotus (387/6) speaks of Clazomenae as "being liable for the twentieth of the time of Thrasybulus" (Tod, *GHI* 114 [= *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 136] lines 7–8),<sup>10</sup> and Athens' regulation of relations between Clazomenae and such other cities as Smyrna and possibly Phocaea recorded in the decree suggests that Athens dominated a number of cities in the Gulf of Smyrna region (lines 17–20),<sup>11</sup> a situation which most probably resulted from Thrasybulus' visits in 389.

Athens' intercession in the affairs of Clazomenae some time after mid-387 had recently underscored Athens' active role in the Gulf of Smyrna region. Clazomenae had its main center on an island in the Gulf of Smyrna about seven hundred yards off the northern shore of the Erythrae peninsula. In addition to a number of other islands which stretched northward in the gulf, Clazomenae's territory included a mainland site known as Chytum (or Chytrium) probably located several miles inland (Strabo 645; Thuc. 8.31.3–4; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Χυτόν*).<sup>12</sup> The Athenian decree from the archonship of Theodotus reveals that the Clazomenaeans on the island had recently fallen into stasis and that members of one faction had taken refuge in Chytum. In response to an appeal from the faction on island Clazomenae the Athenian assembly decreed that the Clazomenaeans were to determine for themselves questions concerning "those at Chytum" and hostages. The assembly also voted on the question of whether the Athenians entirely on

<sup>10</sup>The phrase refers to the five per cent import and export tax imposed by Thrasybulus on various cities in Asia Minor and the north Aegean region in 389; see U. Köhler, "Der Zwanzigstel des Thrasybul," *Ath Mitt* 7 (1882) 313–319. The most recent discussion of the Clazomenae decree is R. Merkelbach, "Das attische Dekret für Klazomenai aus dem Jahr 387," *ZPE* 5 (1970) 32–36.

<sup>11</sup>[Τῶμ πό] | [λεω]ν ὅθεν σιταγωγοῦνται Κλαζομέ[νιοι, Φωκάας καὶ Χί] | [οὐ καὶ Σ]μύρνης, εἶναι ἑσπονδον αὐ[τοῖς ἐς τοὺς λιμένας] | [ς ἑσπλεῖ]ν. A recently discovered inscription from Erythrae (*SEG* 26 [1976/7] 1282) records Athens' regulation of affairs in Erythrae, most probably soon before the time of the edict of Sardis; see S. Şahin, "Ein attisches Dekret für Erythrai," *Türk Tarih Belleten* 40 (1976) 569–571.

<sup>12</sup>J. M. Cook, "The Topography of Klazomenai," *Arch Eph* (1953–54, part 2) 150–157, discusses the probable location of Chytum. Cf. *ATL* 1.503.

their own authority should place an archon and garrison in Clazomenae or whether they should allow the Clazomenaeans to decide for themselves if they wanted to receive these (Tod, *GHI* 114, lines 13–17). The vote apparently favored the second alternative (lines 22–25), but the question itself indicates that in the latter half of 387 the Athenians might intervene on a unilateral basis in the Gulf of Smyrna.

Given Persia's compelling need by late 387 to use the Gulf of Smyrna for preparations for the Cypriote War, Artaxerxes was certainly concerned with ending Athenian involvement in the Gulf of Smyrna region and with precluding the possibility of any direct Athenian interference which might impede Persian preparations. It was undoubtedly this concern that lay behind Artaxerxes' specific claim to Clazomenae in the edict of Sardis in late 387. The general assertion of Persian authority over the cities of Asia Minor in the edict would serve to end Athenian involvement in cities surrounding the Gulf of Smyrna. But since Clazomenae's main center was not on the mainland but on an island in the Gulf of Smyrna Artaxerxes had specifically to designate Clazomenae as Persian in order to establish exclusive Persian authority over the whole Gulf of Smyrna region, the only region in late 387 (except Cyprus) in which conditions in states not on the mainland of Asia Minor were of crucial interest to Persia.

The coupling of the tiny state of Clazomenae and the great island of Cyprus in the edict of Sardis may produce "an oddly assorted pair," but in light of the political and military situation facing Persia in late 387 it is evident that the claim to Clazomenae naturally and necessarily accompanied the claim to Cyprus. In both places Artaxerxes had to exclude Athenian involvement in order effectively to wage war against Evagoras and recover the coastal regions opposite Cyprus, by late 387 the vital preliminary to renewing the attempt to reconquer Egypt.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>I thank the anonymous readers of *Phoenix* for their helpful criticism of an earlier version of this article.